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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
to him in full settlement of his feeY0 To a common law court, the
problem would involve the doctrine of consideration, and its
resolution would turn on whether or not the amount due was in
dispute. On finding that a dispute did exist the common law court
would take the view that the creditor's acceptance of the amount
tendered was supported by consideration and therefore an accord
and satisfaction had occurred. Our court, not without precedent
in our law, however, handled the problem in the same way.
Actually, with us facts of the kind in question raise a prob-
lem of remission. A gratuitous remission is perfectly valid under
our code. To find a remission of the remainder when part pay-
ment is made there should be found an intention to remit or the
creditor should be held estopped by his acceptance of the amount
paid to deny the existence of such intention. The facts show that
the attorney's fee was to be based on the value of certain stock.
No dispute at all had developed before the client sent the check
in question, the amount of which was figured on an arbitrary
value fixed by himself. The attorney kept the check but claimed
with strong support in the facts that the value used by the
client was not the true value of the stock. By the letter he wrote
to his client upon receiving the check, the attorney definitely
negated any intention to remit. There was thus no actual inten-
tion to remit; and it is by no means clear that we should permit
a debtor to claim an estoppel against a creditor who accepts a
payment admittedly due, for it will be remembered that the law





Louisiana's general receivership statute provides for the
judicial appointment of receivers at the instance of minority
shareholders whose interests are "in imminent danger" from gross
mismanagement, persistent ultra vires action or wasting of the
corporate assets.' The corporate receivership, however, is an
expensive and rather drastic remedy, and it may not be resorted
20. Henriques v. Vaccaro, 220 La. 216, 56 So. 2d 236 (1951).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. R.S. 1950, 12:752(2), (11).
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to if simpler and more direct methods of relief are available. In
Peiser v. Grand Isle, Incorporated,2 the Supreme Court upheld
the trial judge's refusal to appoint a receiver on the application
of minority shareholders with two per cent of the outstanding
corporate stock. The petition for a receivership made various
charges of prior mismanagement, co-mingling of corporate funds
with personal funds of the majority shareholder, and irregulari-
ties as to the notice and holding of shareholders' meetings. Evi-
dence in support of these charges was held inadmissible-the
"receivership, as a remedy, looking rather to the prevention of
future injuries than to the redress of past grievances." The only
substantial claim of present mismanagement was the failure of
the corporation to demand immediate repayment of sums owed
to the corporation by the succession of the deceased majority
shareholder. This presented no imminent danger demanding a
receivership, since the indebtedness had been judicially acknowl-
edged by the administrator and the conservative net worth of
the succession's stock was more than three times the amount due.
If an immediate suit had been necessary, the normal method of
asserting such causes of action would be by a minority share-
holder's bill-rather than through the expensive procedure of a
receivership.
The incident which incited the minority shareholder's demand
for a receivership was a contemplated extrajudicial liquidation
of the corporation so that the corporate assets might be liquidated
and administered through the succession of the ninety-eight per
cent shareholder. This procedure would have had the effect of
eliminating the petitioner as a member of the corporate venture
-a result which he opposed. However, the primary purpose was
to secure certain tax advantages, and the contemplated liquida-
tion was in strict conformity with the Louisiana corporation laws.
In this regard the Supreme Court appropriately concluded that
"a receivership to accomplish the same purpose, without a show-
ing to the contrary, would but prolong the procedure and add
expense. '4 In a last analysis, the remedy of a corporate receiver-
ship is an expensive remedy and will not be granted where other
available remedies adequately serve to protect the petitioner's
rights.
2. 60 So. 2d 1 (La. 1952).
3. Id. at 3.
4. Id. at 4.
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